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Abstract
Empirical studies show that preference for prevention versus treat-
ment remains a subject of debate. We build a paradigm model com-
bining a utility game for the individual-level dilemma of prevention
versus treatment, and a compartmental model for the epidemic dy-
namic. We assume that individuals arrive to maximize the utility of
voluntary prevention, as the epidemic reaches an endemic level allevi-
ated by prevention and treatment. We thus obtain an expression for
the asymptotic prevention coverage. Notably, we obtain that, if the rel-
ative cost of prevention versus treatment is sufficiently low, epidemics
may be averted through the use of prevention alone.
1 Introduction
Prevention and treatment are complementary strategies for the public health
authority. Allocation of limited resources between these strategies remains
under continuous debate [1, 2]. Benefit-cost analyses for the long and short
term may yield conflicting results. In addition, individual-level perceptions
of prevention versus treatment could be biased to jeopardize implementation
success of public health programs. Incentives may be used by the practi-
tioners to redirect individual’s attention and alleviate this problem [3].
The issue of prevention versus treatment has been addressed in the con-
text of particular medical issues such as HIV/AIDS [4], cardiovascular mor-
tality [5], well-being in work environment [6] and use of ondansetron against
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intrathecal morphine-induced pruritus [7]. Surveys studies assessed overall
preference for prevention versus treatment in the general population, using
discrete choice questionnaires for qualitative and monetary appreciation, as
well as propensity to pay [8–10]. The results of these studies show that
preference for prevention or treatment depends on the circumstances. A
different approach was to present a policy dilemma of prevention versus
treatment to a random sample of individuals. Their uninformed opinions
compiled for summary statistics, do not show but a slight preference for
prevention versus treatment [11,12]. Furthermore, a study shows preference
for environmental programs, rather than public health programs altogether,
in a comparison of four program pairs [13].
In the late nineties, Geoffard and Philipson [14] opened the theoretical
discussion on the setup where prevention is achieved through voluntary vac-
cination, in absence of treatment. They used an SIR model to describe
epidemic dynamics and assumed that an individual’s probability to get vac-
cinated increases with the perceived utility of vaccination, depending on the
probability that a nonvaccinator is infected during his entire lifetime. Ge-
offard and Philipson focused on pricing strategies for vaccines that provide
complete immunity, given the law of supply and demand tuned by disease
prevalence. Their main result is that demand on the vaccine private market
decreases sufficiently fast toward disease elimination, to make eradication
impossible. Bauch and Earn [15] proposed a different modeling approach,
assuming that the individual-level utility is based only on the current state
of the epidemic, and that a typical individual arrives to maximize the util-
ity of vaccination as a new endemic level is achieved in the presence of
the vaccination program. They also discussed the role of the relative cost
of vaccination versus infection morbidity in determining disease prevalence
at the endemic state. They found that it is impossible to eradicate a dis-
ease through voluntary vaccination when individuals act according to their
own interests. Subsequent literature built upon this modeling framework,
including new modeling aspects; see e.g., Refs. [16, 17].
Here, we analyze the theoretical setup where prevention becomes avail-
able for a treatable disease with complete natural recovery. We assume
that, in the absence of an epidemic, the use of prevention is not motivated
at the population scale. We propose a mathematical model to describe the
interplay of prevention and treatment, where prevention is voluntary and
treatment is mandatory. The model consists of two parts. The epidemic
dynamics is described by an SIR model expressed in terms of ordinary
differential equations. In addition, we use a utility game to describe the
individual-level decisions to join the prevention program. The primary fo-
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cus of the paper is to discuss how the prevention coverage, reached during
an epidemic, depends on the parameters of the prevention and treatment
programs. We find that it is possible for prevention programs to avert an
epidemic if the relative cost of prevention versus treatment is sufficiently
low.
2 Model
Our model consists of two ingredients. First, we use a system of ordinary
differential equations to mimic epidemic dynamics, not explicitly reported
to the public. Second, we specifically describe the individual-level process of
making the decision of whether to use prevention. The primary goal of in-
dividuals is to avoid infection and the impact of infection on their everyday
activity. Individuals may be aware of means of prevention and treatment,
even though they do not not fully understand the corresponding population-
level mechanisms. According to game theory, their decision making skill may
be summarized by a utility function comprising behavioral parameters to de-
scribe how individuals perceive the impact of infection on themselves alone.
We assume that the utility function carries no information on the epidemic
dynamics, depending solely on the current state of the epidemic. A fun-
damental parameter of the utility function could be the current prevalence
of infection, as a surrogate for the probability of acquiring infection. This
information may be obtained explicitly, through public health reports, or
implicitly, through trial, error and adjusting personal decisions to collective
opinion.
Epidemic severity depends on the coverage of prevention and treatment
programs and, in turn, motivates individual-level, voluntary decisions to en-
roll in these programs. We analyze the situation where prevention is made
available during the course of an epidemic of a treatable disease and, as
a result, the epidemic reaches an endemic level, depending on the preven-
tion coverage. We assume that the endemic state is reached as individuals
maximize their perceived utility function for prevention versus treatment.
2.1 Compartmental model
We model an infectious disease with natural recovery. However, we assume
that treatment is available in unlimited supply, so recovered status may
also be achieved through treatment. Although treatment may be offered
on a voluntary basis, we assume that all infectious individuals make the
choice of being treated according to the regulations of the public health
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authority. This transmission dynamic may be described by an SIR-type
model. In addition to treatment, we assume that a prevention program
is always in place, whether or not there is an epidemic. We propose the
following differential equations
dP
dt
= ppi − µP, (1)
dS
dt
= (1− p)pi − µS − βSI
N
, (2)
dI
dt
=
βSI
N
− (µ+ ν + γ)I, (3)
dT
dt
= ξγI − µT, (4)
dR
dt
= (1− ξ)γI + νI − µR, (5)
where the variables stand for: participants to prevention programs (P ),
susceptible (S), infectious (I) and recovered (R) individuals, as well as indi-
viduals cured due to treatment (T ); N = P +S+I+T +R. The parameters
are as follows. The symbol p stands for the probability of using prevention,
pi for the susceptible inflow, µ for disease-unrelated death rate, β for dis-
ease transmissibility, ν for the natural recovery rate and γ for the treatment
rate. The symbols p and ξ represent the coverage of the prevention program
and treatment efficacy, respectively. The model has two equilibria, a
disease-free state and an endemic state. The basic reproduction number of
the model given by Eqs. (1)-(5) is (1 − p)R0, where R0 ≡ β/(µ + ν + γ)
is the basic reproduction number of the SIR model without prevention.
The key result from the SIR model is the endemic prevalence of infectious
individuals, which may be written as
Π =
(1− p)− 1/R0
1 + (ν + γ)/µ
, (6)
where Π > 0 if and only if R0(1− p) > 1.
2.2 Utility game
Individuals must volunteer to enroll into prevention programs. We model
the process of choice as a utility game, including behavioral assumptions for
how each individual analyzes pros and cons of prevention versus treatment
to make his choice. Individuals make their decisions based on an ensemble
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of mixed strategies of prevention and treatment. In all, we summarize the
utility of prevention versus treatment for a typical individual as follows
U(p, cp, ct) =
{
0, if R0 ≤ 1;
p (−cp)− (1− p)ctΠ, if R0 > 1. (7)
Hence, in the case where R0 > 1, individuals would pay the cost of preven-
tion cp with probability that they use prevention p. Otherwise, if infected,
they pay for the cost of treatment ct. We assume that individuals act in their
own interest to maximize the utility of prevention, as the epidemic evolves
toward the endemic level. For further convenience, we use r for cp/ct, the
relative cost of prevention versus treatment. It is reasonable to assume that
prevention is more cost-effective than treatment, hence 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. We also
use U(p, r) for the rescaled utility function U(p, cp, ct)/ct.
3 Results
Maximization of the likelihood U(p, r) yields the following formula for the
probability to enroll in prevention programs
p(r) =
{
1− rrˆ − 12R0 , if 0 ≤ r < rˆ − rˆ2R0 ;
0, if rˆ − rˆ2R0 ≤ r;
(8)
where
rˆ ≡ 2
1 + (ν + γ)/µ
. (9)
From epidemiological perspective, the domain of the function p(r) is
divided into three intervals, represented in Fig. 1 as regions (a), (b) and (c).
For region (a), the relative cost of prevention versus treatment r is small,
so many enough individuals adopt prevention and the epidemic is averted.
Mathematically, we have
0 ≤ r ≤ rˆ/(2R0)⇔ 1/2 ≤ (1− p)R0 ≤ 1. (10)
We note that the minimum coverage to prevent an epidemic is p(rˆ/(2R0)) =
1 − 1/R0, a well-known result for vaccination models; see Refs. [18], p. 87
and [19], Chapter 6. For region (b), the cost of prevention versus treatment
is moderate; i.e., rˆ/(2R0) < r < rˆ − rˆ/(2R0). Hence, individuals adopt
prevention and the epidemic is alleviated. For region (c), the relative cost
5
10
pˆ
r
rˆ
2R0
rˆ   rˆ
2R0
1  1
R0
1  1
2R0
(c)(b)(a)
Figure 1: Probability of using prevention p(r) as a function of the relative
cost of prevention versus treatment r. The [0, 1] interval on the horizontal
axis is divided into three, corresponding to the epidemiological impact of
prevention. For region (a), the epidemic is prevented. For region (b), the
epidemic is alleviated by prevention. For region (c), individuals do not use
prevention measures. We note that the minimum coverage to prevent an
epidemic is p(rˆ/(2R0)) = 1 − 1/R0, a well-known result for vaccination
models.
of prevention versus treatment is too high and individuals disregard the
possibility of disease prevention. That is, if rˆ − rˆ/(2R0) ≤ r, then p = 0.
This theoretical setup applies for the case of vaccination against child-
hood diseases. Parameter values for ν and γ may be found in Ref. [18], p. 31.
Hence, we have rˆ/(2R0) ∼ 10−3. That is, if prevention is thousands of times
less costly that treatment, epidemics are averted by prevention alone. We
postulate that this is the case for vaccination against childhood diseases.
4 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we address the impact of voluntary prevention versus manda-
tory treatment for controlling an epidemic. Previously, Geoffard and Philip-
son [14] argued that, in the case where access to prevention (i.e., vaccina-
tion) is determined by disease prevalence and the law of supply and demand
in private markets, pricing may render impossible to eliminate the disease
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through prevention. However, the public health authority may overrule
the law of supply and demand by, for example, eliminating copayments for
health supplies and services.
Bauch and Earn [15] discussed the individual-level dilemma of to prevent
or not prevent using vaccination, in the absence of treatment, using a mixed
model consisting of ordinary differential equations and a utility game. The
individual-level dilemma rested on the notion of herd immunity alone. This
is as follows. If an individual uses prevention, he avoids infection. However,
when the individual does not use prevention, he may still avoid infection if
his peers use prevention in sufficient numbers such that an epidemic does
not occur. Bauch and Earn concluded that voluntary prevention cannot
drive the epidemic extinct.
Here, we discussed how the prevention coverage depends on the relative
cost of prevention versus treatment, when cost does not change because of
epidemic severity. The individual-level dilemma that occurs in this case
rests on the choice of health strategy. An individual may use prevention
to avoid infection starting immediately. Otherwise, he will eventually get
infected and acquire permanent immunity upon treatment or natural recov-
ery. Notably, according to our modeling framework, voluntary prevention
may prevent epidemics.
Voluntary prevention versus mandatory treatment is a problem ubiq-
uitous in nature. For example, this paradigm question is paramount to
economics, for pricing insurance policy. Another application is to military
strategy, known as the dilemma of preemptive versus defensive war. In this
work, the discussion addressed public health policy.
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